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By A.C. Dike *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 1 has and
will continue to hinder patentees from protecting and enforcing valid design patents
against potential infringers. In Egyptian Goddess, the Federal Circuit addressed the
appropriate legal standard for assessing the claims of a design patent in an infringement
action. The en banc appeal focused on several questions, including “whether the ‘point
of novelty’ test should continue to be used as a test for infringement of a design patent;
whether the court should adopt the ‘non-trivial advance test’ as a means of determining
whether a particular design feature qualifies as a point of novelty; how the point of
novelty test should be administered . . . and whether district courts should perform formal
claim construction in design patent cases.” 2 In a unanimous decision, the Federal Circuit
held that the point of novelty test is “inconsistent with the ordinary observer test and is
not needed to protect against unduly broad assertions of design patent rights.” 3
Part II of this Comment will provide a historical perspective of the current design
patent infringement analysis. Part III of this Comment will outline the procedural history
of Egyptian Goddess I & II. Part IV of this Comment analyzes the court’s determination
that the best course for design patent jurisprudence is the new ordinary observer
approach, which encompasses certain aspects of the point of novelty test. Lastly, Part V
of this Comment will analyze and explain the potential implications that may result from
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Egyptian Goddess and its newly created design patent
infringement standard.
In summary, although the Federal Circuit may argue that it was justified in
abrogating the point of novelty test and cautioning against the verbalization of design
patent claims during claim construction, the court failed to suggest an alternate test or
provide sufficient guidance to the lower courts in cases where a claimed design and an
accused design are not plainly dissimilar. Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s decision
merely provides additional ambiguity to the already mired precedent for determining
design patent infringement.

* J.D. Candidate 2010, Northwestern University School of Law.
1
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess II), 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
2
Id. at 670.
3
Id. at 672.
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II. DESIGN PATENTS
A.
¶4

Gorham’s Ordinary Observer

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) grants a design patent for
any new, original, and ornamental design for articles of manufacture. 4 A design patent
protects only the appearance of the article and cannot be dictated solely by functional
considerations because “function and structure fall under the realm of utility patent[s].” 5
The seminal case and starting point for any discussion regarding design patent law is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gorham Co. v. White. 6 That case involved the infringement
of a design patent for patterns on the handles of knives, forks, and spoons. In its
infringement analysis, the Court concluded that because “sameness of effect upon the
eye, is the main test of substantial identity of design, the only remaining question . . . is,
whether it is essential that the appearance should be the same to the eye of an expert.” 7
The Gorham Court then set forth what has since been recognized as the “ordinary
observer” test:
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such
as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be
the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other. 8

Thus, the Gorham test of design patent infringement essentially determines whether an
ordinary observer, who is considered a potential purchaser of the product at issue, is
likely to be misled.
B.
¶5

The Point of Novelty and Its Progeny

Although the Gorham court recognized the ordinary observer test as the proper
standard for determining design patent infringement, a series of Federal Circuit cases
have relied on Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp. 9 when holding that proof of
similarity under the ordinary observer test is insufficient to establish design patent
infringement. 10 In Litton, Whirlpool challenged the validity of a Litton design patent for
a microwave oven on the basis that the claimed design was obvious in view of a
combination of prior art references. 11 In its infringement analysis, the Litton court
acknowledged that an accused design must also appropriate the novelty of the claimed
design, stating in part:

4

35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006) (“Whoever invents any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).
5
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1503.01 (2008) (“The functional and/or structural
features stressed by applicant in the papers are of no concern in design cases, and are neither permitted nor
required.”).
6
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
7
Id. at 527.
8
Id. at 528.
9
728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. (Egyptian Goddess II), 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
11
Litton, 728 F.2d at 1436.
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For a design patent to be infringed . . . no matter how similar two items look, “the
accused device must appropriate the novelty in the patented device which
distinguishes it from the prior art.” That is, even though the court compares two
items through the eyes of the ordinary observer, it must nevertheless, to find
infringement, attribute their similarity to the novelty which distinguishes the
patented device from the prior art. 12

¶6

¶7

¶8

Ultimately, the Litton court determined that the accused device did not share any of the
combination of features it identified as distinguishing the Litton oven from the prior art.
Consequently, the court held that the accused device did not infringe. 13 Since the Litton
decision, this additional test has been referred to as the “point of novelty” test, and has
been recognized as a second distinctive test, in addition to the ordinary observer test,
required in proving design patent infringement. 14
Later, in Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner International, LLC, 15 the Federal Circuit
attempted to provide additional clarity to the lower courts in their attempt to apply the
point of novelty test. This case involved a design patent covering a steering wheel
locking device used to prevent auto theft. The defendant, Winner, contested that the
eight points of novelty in the claimed design were also present in the prior art. In
contrast, Lawman argued that while the eight points of novelty may not be individually
novel, the combination in a single design of eight non-novel elements was itself novel. 16
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered
summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Winner, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the eight discrete points of novelty
identified in the claimed design were not novel. Additionally, the Federal Circuit
determined that Lawman could not rely on a combination of non-novel elements in order
to constitute a new, “ninth point of novelty.” 17 The Federal Circuit concluded that
Lawman’s argument for aggregating non-novel features was “inconsistent with, and
would seriously undermine, the rationale of the ‘points of novelty’ test.” 18
Although the Federal Circuit denied Lawman’s petition for a rehearing en banc,
the court provided a clarifying opinion addressing the issue of design element
aggregation under the point of novelty test. 19 In that opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the panel’s conclusion that the overall appearance of a design cannot itself be a point of
novelty, but also determined that “in appropriate circumstances a combination of design
elements itself may constitute a ‘point of novelty.’” 20 While the court refused to
reconsider whether the combination of the eight design elements created a new point of
novelty, or what could be considered “appropriate circumstances,” it did note that within
12

Id. at 1444 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
14
See Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Beyond the
substantial similarity requirement of Gorham . . . design patent infringement requires that the accused
product ‘appropriate the novelty in the patented device which distinguishes it from the prior art.’”).
15
437 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
16
Id. at 1385.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 449 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (supplemental opinion on
petition for rehearing).
20
Id. at 1192.
13
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those appropriate circumstances, “[s]uch a combination is a different concept than the
overall appearance of a design which . . . our cases have recognized cannot be a point of
novelty.” 21
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa I: Procedural History

¶9

Egyptian Goddess’s U.S. Design Patent 467,389 (“D’389 patent”) claims a design
for a nail buffer consisting of a rectangular, hollow tube with a generally square crosssection and buffer surfaces on three of its four sides. 22 Swisa, a competitor of Egyptian
Goddess, produced an accused design that consisted of a rectangular, hollow tube with a
square cross-section, but which featured buffer surfaces on all four of its sides. 23
¶10
Egyptian Goddess sued Swisa, claiming that Swisa’s fingernail buffers infringed its
D’389 design. In response, Swisa filed a motion for summary judgment of noninfringement and invalidity. 24 Egyptian Goddess supported its infringement claim by
asserting that the point of novelty of the D’389 design was its unique combination of four
design elements, which were all individually known in the prior art.
¶11
The district court declined to address the issue of whether a point of novelty could
be found in the combination of design elements present in various prior art references.
Rather, the court found that a single prior art reference, U.S. Design Patent 416,648 (“the
Nailco patent”), contained all but one of the elements of the D’389 design. 25
Accordingly, the district court granted Swisa’s summary judgment of non-infringement
on the ground that Egyptian Goddess failed to satisfy its burden under the point of
novelty test. Additionally, the district court concluded that the accused Swisa nail buffers
did not contain the point of novelty that was in the D’389 design, stating in part that
“[t]he only point of novelty in the D’389 Patent over the Nailco Patent is the addition of
the fourth side without a pad.” 26
¶12
In Egyptian Goddess I, 27 a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s ruling, concluding that the lower court did not err in rejecting Egyptian
Goddess’ asserted point of novelty as a matter of law. The Federal Circuit panel
reiterated its precedent requiring two distinct tests for establishing design patent
infringement, the ordinary observer test and the point of novelty test. In reaching its
decision, the panel stated that the point of novelty in a patented design “can be either a
single novel design element or a combination of elements that are individually known in
the prior art.” 28 However, when analyzing Egyptian Goddess’ asserted combination point
of novelty, the Federal Circuit determined that in order “[f]or a combination of

21

Id.
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa Inc., No. 3:30-CV-0594-N, 2005 WL 5873510, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 14, 2005).
23
Id. at *2.
24
Id. at *1.
25
Id. at *2.
26
Id.
27
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa Inc. (Egyption Goddess I), 498 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
28
Id. at 1357.
22
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individually known design elements to constitute a point of novelty, the combination
must be a non-trivial advance over the prior art.” 29
¶13
Applying this newly fashioned requirement, which had not been addressed in briefs
or at oral argument by either party, 30 the panel determined that “no reasonable juror could
conclude that [Egyptian Goddess’s] asserted point of novelty constituted a non-trivial
advance over the prior art.” 31 In agreeing with the district court’s decision, 32 the Federal
Circuit stated that since the Swisa buffers have raised, abrasive pads on all four sides
while the D’389 design only has such pads on three of its four sides, “[w]hen considering
the prior art in the nail buffer field, this difference between the accused design and the
patented design cannot be considered minor.” 33
¶14
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit panel concluded that summary judgment was
indeed appropriate. Soon after, Egyptian Goddess filed a petition for a rehearing en
banc. 34 In granting the en banc hearing, the Federal Circuit vacated its earlier decision in
Egyptian Goddess I and requested briefing from both parties regarding (1) whether the
point of novelty test should continue to be used as a test for infringement of a design
patent, (2) whether claim construction should apply to design patents, and (3) what role
such construction should play in the infringement analysis if deemed necessary. 35
B.

Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa II: Federal Circuit Opinion

With Judge Bryson delivering the unanimous opinion of the Federal Circuit, 36 the
court first gave a description of the accused product at issue, the facts of the case, as well
as the procedural history. In providing an extensive overview of design patent
infringement precedent, the Federal Circuit reiterated the Gorham requirements under the
ordinary observer test and stressed that this test was to be recognized as “the proper
standard for determining design patent infringement.” 37
¶16
The Federal Circuit then revisited its opinion in Litton Systems v. Whirlpool, which
gave birth to the point of novelty test as a second and necessary analysis when evaluating
infringement in design patent cases. The Federal Circuit recognized that Litton had been
widely acknowledged as the genesis of a second design patent infringement test, but
noted that “[i]n cases decided shortly after Litton, the court described the ordinary
observer test and the point of novelty test as ‘conjunctive.’ It has not been until much
more recently that this court has described the ordinary observer and point of novelty test
as ‘two distinct tests.’” 38
¶17
The Federal Circuit went on to describe that although “the point of novelty test has
proved reasonably easy to apply in simple cases” where a single novel feature exists in a

¶15

29

Id.
Id. at 1359 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
31
Id. at 1358 (majority opinion).
32
Id. (“The district court correctly determined that only if the point of novelty included a fourth side
without a raised pad could it even arguably be a non-trivial advance over the prior art.”).
33
Id.
34
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa Inc., 256 F. App’x 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
35
Id. at 357-58.
36
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d 665, 667-68 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
37
Id. at 670.
38
Id. at 671 (internal citations omitted).
30
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claimed design, it has been more difficult to apply the test “where the claimed design has
numerous features that can be considered points of novelty, or where multiple prior art
designs are in issue.” 39 In particular, the court noted that “applying the point of novelty
test where multiple features and multiple prior art references are in play has led to
disagreement over whether combinations of features, or the overall appearance of a
design, can constitute the point of novelty of the claimed design.” 40
¶18
In a striking retreat from its prior opinions, the Federal Circuit determined that
neither Litton nor any preceding authority indicated the adoption of the point of novelty
test “as a second and free-standing requirement for proof of design patent
infringement.” 41 The court rejected Swisa’s argument that the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Whitman Saddle Co., 42 and subsequent cases thereafter, adopted the point of novelty test
as a second and distinct test for design patent infringement. 43 Rather, the court concluded
that
Litton and the predecessor cases on which it relied [on in creating the point of
novelty test] are more properly read as applying a version of the ordinary
observer test in which the ordinary observer is deemed to view the differences
between the patented design and the accused product in the context of the prior
art. 44

The court explained that “when the claimed design is close to the prior art designs, small
differences between the accused design and the claimed design are likely to be important
to the eye of the hypothetical ordinary observer.” 45 Thus, the court determined that not
only was such an approach consistent with prior precedent, but that it also provided a
logical solution to “highlight[ing] the distinctions between the claimed design and the
accused design as viewed by the ordinary observer” by adding the prior art as a discrete
frame of reference. 46
¶19
The court then went on to identify several advantages of using this new “ordinary
observer” test, which applied the existing ordinary observer test with reference to prior
art designs, over the previous two-part test in which the point of novelty test was a
second, independent test. 47 First, the court recognized that the new ordinary observer
approach avoids the problem that, under the point of novelty test where a design has
multiple points of novelty, “the outcome of the case can turn on which of the several
candidate points of novelty the court or fact-finder focuses on.” 48 Therefore, the attention
of the court may now be focused on whether the accused design has appropriated the
claimed design as a whole.

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id. at 672.
42
148 U.S. 674 (1893).
43
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d at 673 (“Nothing in the Court’s opinion suggested that it was
fashioning a separate point of novelty test for infringement.”).
44
Id. at 676.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 677.
47
Id.
48
Id.
40
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¶20

Second, the court determined that this new test will likely “produce results more in
line with the purposes of design patent protection” 49 in cases where there are multiple
points of novelty because it inquires how an ordinary observer with knowledge of the
prior art design would view the differences between the claimed and accused designs.
Furthermore, a defendant will have additional opportunities to argue that its design does
not infringe because it does not copy all of the points of novelty, even though it may copy
most of them. 50 Third, unlike the point of novelty test, the new ordinary observer test
does not present the risk of assigning exaggerated importance to small differences
between the claimed and accused designs relating to an insignificant feature simply
because that feature can be characterized as a point of novelty. Lastly, the court noted
that this new approach also has the advantage of “avoiding the debate over the extent to
which a combination of old design features can serve as a point of novelty under the point
of novelty test.” 51
¶21
Although the Federal Circuit abrogated the point of novelty test, it did not
completely dismiss its importance in determining design patent infringement. The court
noted that examining the novel features of the claimed design can be an important
component of the comparison of the claimed design with the accused design and the prior
art. However, such a comparison “must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer
test, not as part of a separate test.” 52
¶22
Ultimately, the court held that in instances “when the claimed and accused designs
are not plainly dissimilar, resolution of the question whether the ordinary observer would
consider two designs to be substantially the same will benefit from a comparison of the
claimed and accused designs with the prior art.” 53 Additionally, the court noted that the
new ordinary observer test imposed a slight change to the parties’ respective burden of
production in design patent infringement cases. Under the previous two-part rule, a
patentee bore the burden of production with respect to the prior art, but under this new
approach, the accused infringer now bears this burden, but only if a comparison to the
prior art is raised as part of its defense. 54
¶23
Lastly, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether trial courts should
conduct claim construction in design patent cases. Although the court had previously
ruled that lower courts have a duty to conduct claim construction in design patent cases,
as in utility cases, 55 the court had never prescribed specific guidelines or any particular
form the claim construction should take. 56 The Federal Circuit determined that since
there has been a growing recognition by lower courts that design patents are typically
claimed as shown in drawings and that claim construction is adapted accordingly, there is
no need for a trial court to attempt to provide a detailed verbal description of the claimed

49

Id. at 678.
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 678.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 679; see Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Determining
whether a design patent claim has been infringed requires, first, as with utility patents, that the claim be
properly construed to determine its meaning and scope.” (internal citation omitted)).
56
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d, at 679.
50
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design. 57 However, the court emphasized that a district court’s decision regarding the
level of detail to be used in describing the claimed design is a matter within the court’s
discretion. 58
C.

Application of Law to the Facts of the Case

¶24

The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the general shape of the accused nail buffer
was the same as that of the patented buffer. The main difference between the two was
that the accused design had raised buffing pads on all four sides, while the patented
design had buffers on three sides. Under its new ordinary observer approach, the court
distilled the issue in Egyptian Goddess II to whether an ordinary observer, familiar with
the Nailco design, prior art, would be deceived into believing that the Swisa buffer is the
same as the patented buffer, D’389. 59
¶25
Egyptian Goddess argued that such an ordinary observer, after viewing the patented
and accused design, would be substantially confused when purchasing the accused buffer,
thinking it to be the patented buffer design. Furthermore, Egyptian Goddess claimed that
to an ordinary purchaser of nail buffers, the presence of one or more buffer pads did not
“greatly alter the ornamental effect and appearance of the whole design as compared to
the whole patented design.” 60
¶26
In contrast, Swisa argued that the D’389 patent closely tracked the prior art. Swisa
claimed that in light of the prior art buffers, an ordinary observer would notice the
difference between the claimed and accused design because the “number of sides with
abrasive surfaces on them would be important to purchasers.” 61 Ultimately, the court
rejected Egyptian Goddess’ argument concluding that Egyptian Goddess failed to show
that an ordinary observer would regard the accused design as being closer to the claimed
design than to the Nailco prior art design. As a result, the Federal Circuit unanimously
held that “no reasonable fact-finder could find that [Egyptian Goddess] met its burden of
showing . . . that an ordinary observer, taking into account the prior art, would believe the
accused design to be the same as the patented design.” 62
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

¶27

The Federal Circuit’s New Ordinary Observer Test is Untenable

The Federal Circuit erred when it ineffectively combined the rudiments of the point
of novelty approach with the Gorham ordinary observer test, thus creating an ambiguous
standard for determining design patent infringement. When Judge Bryson began the
court’s analysis of the proper standard for determining design patent infringement by
“reconsidering the place of the point of novelty test in design patent law generally,” he
seemingly signaled the total abrogation of the test. 63
57

Id.
Id. at 680.
59
Id. at 681.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 682.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 671.
58
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¶28

Nonetheless, in articulating the new ordinary observer test, the Federal Circuit idly
retained the imprecise prior art comparisons of the point of novelty test without giving
sufficient guidance to the lower courts on its appropriate application in the new ordinary
observer test. The Federal Circuit emphasized its past jurisprudence requiring the
perspective ordinary observer to be informed by a comparison of the accused and
patented design with the prior art. 64 However, design patent precedent is far from clear as
to the appropriate standard for enabling the fact-finder to determine whether an accused
design has appropriated the inventiveness of a patented design.
¶29
The court reiterated that the point of novelty test has been difficult to apply where
“multiple features and multiple prior art references are in play,” 65 but the three-way
comparison approach articulated by the court is unworkable for the same reasons it
deemed the point of novelty test impractical. The Federal Circuit justified its departure
from the point of novelty test by stating that in cases where several different features
could be argued as points of novelty, the outcome of the case can turn on which of the
several points of novelty the fact-finder focuses on. 66
¶30
The Federal Circuit stated that the court’s attention “may therefore be focused on
whether the accused design has appropriated a single specified feature of the claimed
design, rather than on the proper inquiry, i.e., whether the accused design has
appropriated the claimed design as a whole.” 67 However, the three-way comparison test
accepted by the Federal Circuit fails to address the complexities created when the
claimed and accused designs are not plainly dissimilar. Although the Federal Circuit
advocates that the ordinary observer will “benefit from a comparison of the claimed and
accused design with the prior art” when determining substantial similarity, 68 under this
new approach, the fact-finder is still forced to take into consideration either comparing
multiple prior art references at one time, or mentally combining the prior art designs
before such a comparison could be made. This deluge of information on the fact finder,
without proper guidance from the courts on how to assess, interpret, and apply the
information attained from prior art comparisons, will still result in improper findings
when the accused and claimed designs are substantially similar.
B.
¶31

No Ado About Substantial Similarity

The court’s swift reliance on the newly fashioned three-way comparison approach
is puzzling and fails to address the issue of design patent protection in instances where
the accused design does not contain the novel features that rendered the design
patentable. Even though the Federal Circuit contradicted years of design patent
jurisprudence by broadly stating that nothing in Whitman Saddle or subsequent
authorities indicated the adoption of a point of novelty test to protect against unduly
broad assertion of patent rights, 69 the court still failed to adequately integrate the purpose
of the point of novelty test into its new ordinary observer approach. The court

64

Id. at 674.
Id. at 671.
66
Id. at 677.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 678.
69
Id. at 672.
65
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characterized the purpose of the point of novelty test as being a “focus on those aspects of
a design which render the design different from prior art designs.” 70 However, this
reinterpretation of the ordinary observer test could lead to infringement findings even
where the accused design does not contain any of the novel features of the patented
design.
¶32
This new approach is untenable in instances where the patented design is a
combination of widely known design elements from two or more prior art references, as
in Smith v. Whitman Saddle and Egyptian Goddess. Whitman Saddle involved a patent
design for saddles, in which the inventor combined the front and back end of two
different saddles that were already well known at the time. The Supreme Court in that
case determined that the new design involved invention. However, if we apply the court’s
new ordinary observer approach to Whitman Saddle, an ordinary observer in that case
would have been required to compare the saddle prior art designs to the accused saddle
design, and then compare the accused design to the patented design.
¶33
The ordinary observer in such a situation would have likely found that the accused
design was “closer” to the tangible, already combined, patented design because the only
difference would be the small drop of the pommel. However, such an analysis would
undermine the Supreme Court’s actual Whitman Saddle decision 71 and reduce the
threshold level for finding a design unpatentable. Furthermore, this new approach is
flawed because an accused design, in the eye of the ordinary observer, will invariably
look “closer” to one patented design, than several prior art designs. Likewise, few fact
finders will be able to accurately imagine the combination of the known features of
multiple prior art designs in order to perform a comparison of that combination to the
accused design.
¶34
The Federal Circuit seemed to recognize the significance of the point of novelty
test, conceding that the examination of “novel features of the claimed design can be an
important component of the comparison of the claimed design with the accused design
and the prior art.” 72 However, this concept was slowly vitiated by the court’s faulty
reasoning that the purpose of the point of novelty test could “be equally well served by
applying the ordinary observer test through the eyes of an observer familiar with the prior
art.” 73 By mandating that “the comparison of the designs, including the examination of
any novel features, must be conducted as part of the ordinary observer test,” 74 the Federal
Circuit has severely loosened the enforceable scope of design patents. Ultimately,
eliminating the point of novelty test without appropriately incorporating its underlying
principles into the court’s new ordinary observer approach will deter the public from
designing around patents to make new inventions. This directly contradicts a practice

70
Id. at 677 (quoting Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
71
See Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 681 (1893) (“If, therefore this drop were material to
the design, and rendered it patentable as a complete and integral Whole, there was no infringement. As
before said, the design of the patent had two features of difference as compared with the Granger saddle,
one the cantle, the other the drop, and unless there was infringement as to the latter there was none at all,
since the saddle design of the patent does not otherwise differ from the old saddle with the old cantle added
. . . .”).
72
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d at 678.
73
Id. at 677.
74
Id. at 678.
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which has consistently been encouraged by the Federal Circuit and the patent system in
general. 75
C.

The En Banc Panel Undermined The Federal Circuit’s Previous Decision in
Egyptian Goddess II

¶35

The Federal Circuit attempted to add clarity to the already mired issue of claim
construction for design patents, but it only managed to inject more confusion into the
claim construction process. By not taking the definitive position of prohibiting detailed
verbal characterizations of design patents, the Federal Circuit put the onus on future
design patent cases at the district court level to develop the application of the proper
infringement standard. Rather than completely prohibiting such verbal characterizations,
or only limiting the scope of verbal descriptions to notifying the fact-finder of functional
elements within a design patent, 76 the court merely delegated its burden of deciding this
issue onto the lower courts.
By not prohibiting or strictly limiting verbal
characterizations of design patents, the en banc Federal Circuit panel contradicted its
previous decision in Egyptian Goddess II.
¶36
The Federal Circuit abrogated the point of novelty test and developed its new
approach based on the underlying principles of the ordinary observer; however, Gorham
explicates that drawings, not verbal characterizations, should control claim construction.
In Gorham, the Supreme Court determined that the “controlling consideration is the
resultant effect” of the overall design on the eye of the ordinary observer, 77 and the
Federal Circuit acknowledged this by focusing the new ordinary observer approach on
the proper inquiry of whether an accused design has appropriated the claimed design as a
whole. 78
¶37
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit failed to realize that allowing district courts to
control the level of detailed description for design patent claim construction only
encourages breaking a design patent down into its discrete elements. One must assume
that the Federal Circuit, which attacked the point of novelty test for increasing the risk of
a fact finder assigning exaggerated importance to small differences between the claimed
and accused design, must believe that such practices cannot occur under the vigilant eye
of a district court judge.
¶38
Although the Federal Circuit may believe that unduly invading a jury’s fact-finding
process is a “task that trial courts are very much accustomed to,” 79 allowing a district
court to verbally characterize design patents effectively shifts the fact-finding burden
from the jurors to the courts. The Federal Circuit has recognized that it would be
“unwise to attempt a full description of the claimed design,” yet it still urged lower courts

75

See Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting State Indus., Inc.
v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (“[K]eeping track of a competitor’s
products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff of which
competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer.”).
76
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d at 680 (“[A] trial court can usefully guide the finder of fact by . . .
distinguishing between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely
functional.”) (citation omitted).
77
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 526 (1871).
78
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d at 677.
79
Id. at 680.
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to “guide” the jury by describing the court’s own analysis to point out differences
between the claimed and accused design. 80 Although the Federal Circuit rejected the
point of novelty test for being inconsistent with the Gorham test, it then contradicted
itself by allowing district courts to verbally characterize design patents, which requires a
similar element-by-element analysis, rather than focusing on the appearance of the design
as a whole.
¶39
The Federal Circuit agreed that design patents typically are claimed as shown in
drawings, and as such, claim construction is adapted accordingly. 81 Indeed, the court was
correct in recognizing the difficulties entailed in trying to describe a design in words.
However, the Federal Circuit discarded this helpful insight of uniformity and specificity,
when it merely articulated a “preferable course” for lower courts to not construe design
patents with detailed verbal descriptions. 82
¶40
Attempts to verbalize the claims of a design patent will have a probable
consequence of confusing jurors since words are usually ineffective in accurately
describing the appearance of a design. 83 Verbal descriptions are often either too broad or
too narrow to fully capture the overall appearance of a patent design and could have the
harrowing effect of either expanding or restricting the actual scope of a design. It would
be utterly perplexing for jurors to be charged with conducting a visual test mandated by
the court’s new ordinary observer approach, while also being given a written claim
construction of the design patent to “guide” their fact-finding. A juror’s perception of the
overall appearance may differ from the court’s expressed verbalization, or even worse,
that perception could be influenced by the court’s construction. Leaving the level of
verbal description to the discretion of the lower courts will simply prolong the issue of
claim construction for design patents, forcing the Federal Circuit to deal with a split in
authority that they themselves fabricated.
V. IMPLICATIONS
¶41

The rejection of the point of novelty test by the Federal Circuit and its vague
decision regarding design patent claim construction is certain to cause a change in the
way that district courts handle the question of design patent infringement. Its effect on
patent holders and investors is far from predictable. What is more, the Federal Circuit
has arguably opened the door for findings of design patent infringement in at least some
instances where infringement would otherwise have been more difficult to prove.
A.

¶42

An Increase in the Number of Design Patent Applications Will Cause a Decrease
in Innovation

Since 1977, when the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) first
began tracking this statistic, the number of design patent applications filed in the USPTO
80

Id.
Id. at 679.
82
Id.
83
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1503.01 pt. II (2008) (“No description of the design in
the specification beyond a brief description of the drawing is generally necessary, since as a rule the
illustration in the drawing views is its own best description.”).
81
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has increased yearly. 84 For example, the USPTO received over 27,752 design patent
applications in 2007, compared with 25,553 in 2005 and 22,603 in 2003. 85 This data
indicates that there has been an increasing trend towards filing design patent applications.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s decision to combine the more pliant ordinary
observer test with the rigid point of novelty test effectively increases the potency of
design patent protection, and will undoubtedly increase the number of design patent
applications filed with the USPTO in the upcoming year. Given that the process of
attaining a design patent is not as rigorous as that of a utility patent and is considerably
less expensive, with costs for filing and attorneys fees ranging from $1500 to $2500, 86
inventors and businesses will quickly inundate the USPTO with design applications in
order to capitalize on the increased protection under the new ordinary observer approach.
However, design patent filing history statistics also indicate that it is far from
certain whether the USPTO will issue a patent when an inventor applies for design patent
protection. In 2007, over 24,060 design patents were granted, compared with 12,950
design patents in 2005 and 16,574 design patents in 2003. 87 Accordingly, the number of
applications received does not necessarily correlate with the number of patents granted.
This will only be more evident under the Federal Circuit’s decision in Egyptian Goddess
II.
Compared to the old two-prong design infringement standard, the new ordinary
observer approach increases the probability for a patent holder to find that an accused
design infringes a patented design in light of the prior art. Because patentees now have
the increased capability of proving infringement, specifically in cases where a patented
design contains multiple novel features, USPTO examiners may also have an increased
opportunity to reject the validity of design patent applications that may have been granted
under the old standard.
Additionally, the court’s failure to clearly minimize the role of verbal
characterizations of design patents during claim construction may ultimately decrease the
number of design patents granted to inventors. Under the departed point of novelty test,
design patent claims focused on the novel features of the accused and claimed products,
thus disclaiming the rest of the design. However, the court’s pronouncement to return to
the fundamentals of the ordinary observer test could create a shift towards design patent
claims that include verbose descriptions of the product due to the increased possibility
that an “ordinary observer” may find additional similarities between the claimed and
accused designs.
When making comparisons of design patents that also include verbal
characterizations of the patents, two features can be verbally construed to seem more
different than they truly are, thus shifting emphasis from the visual aspect to the verbal
descriptions of a patent design. Given that the Federal Circuit failed to place adequate
limitations on design patent construction claims, instead deferring to the lower courts to
84

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2008,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
85
Id.
86
Revision of Patent Fees for Fiscal Year 2009, 73 Fed. Reg. 107 (Jun. 3, 2008) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1-41), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/73fr31655.pdf (last visited
Aug. 15, 2008).
87
Id.
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solve this issue, the court’s own fears could come to fruition, 88 with the pen soon
becoming mightier than the design.
¶47
The uncertainty of the Federal Circuit’s ruling regarding the limits of design patent
claim construction, as well as its decision to refurbish the ordinary observer standard of
design patent infringement, appears likely to cause inventors to be hesitant when
choosing to invest in an increasingly unsteady process. The Constitution states that the
purpose of the patent system is “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.” 89
¶48
Nonetheless, when the probability of getting a patent is uncertain, an inventor has
little, if any, incentive to innovate. It may be difficult to predict with some precision the
extent to which decreased incentives inhibit creativity since there has seemingly been a
constant increase in design patent applications to the USPTO. However, like most
investments, the higher the risk, the less valuable it comes to the risk-taker, and getting a
valid design patent will be no different.
B.
¶49

The Heightened and Unfortunate Role of the Fact Finder Under the New
Ordinary Observer Approach

An obvious consequence of the Federal Circuit’s reliance on the ordinary observer
standard for determining design patent infringement will be an increased reliance for the
fact-finder to deliberate whether infringement has occurred. The ability for trial judges to
easily dispose of design patent infringement cases by means of summary judgment has
been severely diminished now that the determination of design patent infringement has
been solely consolidated into the eye of the ordinary observer. Rather than deciding the
issue before the onset of expensive, time-consuming, and exhaustive discovery, a trial
judge must now defer to the fact finder to unearth substantial similarity between the
accused and claimed designs during the course of avoidable litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION

¶50

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit erred when it candidly abrogated the
point of novelty test without providing the appropriate framework to effectively combine
that test with the fundamentals of the ordinary observer test. Instead of having a
workable, predictable, and uniform test for determining the question of design patent
infringement, we are left with an indistinct mandate from the Federal Circuit to employ a
“parallel” approach to an abrogated test. 90 The Federal Circuit failed to adequately
examine the problems underlying the issue determining design patent infringement to
find an appropriate solution. Instead, the court settled on devising a temporary solution
by combining the prospective problem, the point of novelty test, with the purported
solution, the ordinary observer test.
88

Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d at 679 (“[A] design is better represented by an illustration ‘than it
could be by any description . . . .’” (quoting Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886))).
89
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
90
Egyptian Goddess II, 543 F.3d at 683 (“[A]lthough we do not adopt the ‘non-trivial advance’ test
employed by the panel in this case, we note that our analysis under the ordinary observer test is parallel to
the panel’s approach in an essential respect.”).
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In Egyptian Goddess II, the Federal Circuit exhibited a delinquency in the
specificity of its opinion. While clear writing is a product of clear thinking, the Federal
Circuit’s quasi-cogent analysis of the weaknesses of the point of novelty test and its
apparent determination to rehabilitate the ordinary observer test did not translate into a
clear exposition of a future design patent infringement standard. The underlying results
of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Egyptian Goddess II are also self-indicative. After
the Federal Circuit invested time and effort in Egyptian Goddess I to develop a viable
solution to the problems embedded in determining an effective design patent
infringement standard that will cater to judicial notions of fair play and substantial
justice, the original panel decision, affirming the finding of non-infringement based
primarily on the closeness of the prior art design to the patented design, was upheld.
¶52
The result of the Federal Circuit’s decision is a likely return to ambiguity with
regard to the question of an apt standard for design patent infringement, as well as the
appropriate role of claim construction in design patent case law. While this decision
marks a possible improvement for patent holders, it still fails in creating a more effective
and simple approach to proving design patent infringement. Consequently, the district
courts will likely develop new tests to resolve that ambiguity, and when that happens, the
Federal Circuit will likely be pushed into once again reviewing the state of design patent
infringement jurisprudence. Perhaps then, it will take the opportunity to investigate
further and develop a workable approach, much like the one it just recently rejected.
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